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This study investigated patterns of reasoning regarding different types of 
moral transgressions and different measures of moral development in children 
6–8 years of age (N = 130). The findings documented different patterns of 
reasoning for each measure and for transgressions including different moral 
principles. Children distinguished between their understanding of their emo-
tional response to a transgression and the moral violation that has occurred, 
using much more moral reasoning when justifying act evaluations and much 
more self-interest reasoning when justifying emotion attributions. Children also 
differentiated between different types of moral violations—that is, transgres-
sions including different moral principles. Stories about others’ welfare elicited 
reasoning related to others’ welfare, stories about fairness elicited reasoning 
related to equality/rights/fairness, and a multifaceted story elicited both types 
of moral reasoning.
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Research on moral judgments has documented the early emergence of moral 
principles such as fairness, justice, and rights (Mulvey, Hitti, Smetana, & 
Killen, 2016) and the complexity of children’s moral reasoning in differ-
ent contexts. For instance, research has shown that, as early as 6–8 years of 
age, children weigh concerns about group identity and group loyalty with 
the desire to adhere to moral principles (Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). 
Moreover, the field of moral development is robust, with research findings 
demonstrating sophistication in children’s and adolescents’ moral reasoning 
across contexts and in a range of different cultures (Killen & Smetana, 2015).
However, while moral reasoning is frequently measured, new research 
is critically needed that examines how children weigh different moral prin-
ciples across a range of contexts. This involves testing moral judgments by 
using a range of moral scenarios—ones that are straightforward and ones 
that are complex—with one sample of children. The current study is novel in 
that it tests, in concert, children’s moral reasoning patterns when the children 
respond to different moral measures and assesses these patterns in response 
to a range of different types of moral transgressions. The aim of the study was 
to bring two distinct, but prolific, moral development research paradigms—
social domain theory (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) and moral motivation 
theory (Nunner-Winkler, 2009; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988)—together 
to assess moral judgments and reasoning from both perspectives.
Theoretical Framework
Moral judgments have been approached from a number of distinct research 
frameworks. New research that draws together these frameworks will pro-
vide novel insight into how the findings are complementary or distinct. 
Whereas moral judgment research is well established using both social 
domain theory (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) and moral motivation theory 
(Nunner-Winkler, 2009; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988), scant research 
has brought together these distinct approaches and drawn on the strengths 
of both traditions.
Social domain theory (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) demonstrates 
that children use three distinct domains when reasoning about social judg-
ments: the moral domain, which involves issues of rights, justice, fairness, 
and others’ welfare; the social–conventional domain, which involves cus-
toms, traditions, and deference to authority figures; and the psychologi-
cal domain, which references personal choice, autonomy, and self-interest. 
Broadly, findings demonstrate that children perceive transgressions in the 
moral domain to be universally wrong, however violations that are social–
conventional are judged to be context dependent and based on societal con-
sent (Killen & Smetana, 2015). Research from a social domain tradition 
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typically assesses children’s moral judgments by using measures such as 
act evaluation, where participants are asked to judge how okay or not okay 
an act is and provide social reasoning to justify their evaluation.
Moral motivation theory (Nunner-Winkler, 2009; Nunner-Winkler & 
Sodian, 1988) demonstrates that, whereas children understand moral prin-
ciples from a very early age, they do not always act upon these moral prin-
ciples. For instance, a child may choose not to abide by a moral principle 
because of competing personal desires, which can impede children’s ability 
to apply moral principles. Thus, it is not enough to know a moral norm, 
children need to personally accept the validity of moral principles and 
thereby internalize them and develop moral motivation (Malti, Gummerum, 
Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). Moral motivation is the willingness to follow 
moral rules that a person understands to be valid, even if this entails personal 
costs or conflicts with one’s own interests (Nunner-Winkler, 2007, 2009).
Research on moral motivation theory traditionally relies upon emotion 
attribution measures, where children identify either how they expect the 
transgressor would feel or how they would feel if they committed the same 
act (Malti & Ongley, 2014). Besides this categorical coding of anticipated 
emotions, in recent research, Likert-type scales have also been used to mea-
sure the valence and intensity of attributed emotions (Krettenauer, Campbell, 
& Hertz, 2013; Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006; Malti, Killen, & Gasser, 2012). 
Social reasoning is usually assessed, as well. The intensity and direction of 
attributed emotions indicate the subjective significance of moral principles 
(Nunner-Winkler, 1998, 2007). In this context, research has demonstrated 
that some children are happy victimizers and expect a moral transgressor 
(e.g., a child stealing candy) to be happy, even though they understand the 
validity of the moral rule (see Arsenio, 2014; Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 
2006). This is because, although they understand and even support the moral 
rule, they focus more on the personal gains than on the moral rule. Thus, 
research on moral motivations has clarified instances where children’s emo-
tion attributions may not align with their evaluation of the act itself.
An Integrated Approach: Social Domain Theory and Moral 
Motivation
Whereas these two research traditions—social domain theory and moral 
motivation theory—have often been distinct, some research has been con-
ducted that draws together the measures used in both traditions (Malti et al., 
2012; Malti, Strohmeier, & Killen, 2015). What is still needed, however, is a 
comprehensive examination of the reasoning patterns associated with both 
types of measures. Children’s justifications for their moral judgments reveal 
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an understanding of the validity of moral norms (Malti, Gasser, & Buchmann, 
2009) but may not necessarily correspond with the motives for moral actions 
(Sengsavang, Willemsen, & Krettenauer, 2015). Thus, new research is needed 
that compares children’s patterns of reasoning across these types of measures 
in order to clarify what underlying constructs are at play when children pro-
vide these different evaluations. For instance, do act evaluation measures elicit 
more moral reasoning than do emotion attributions? What about reasoning 
about self-interest?
Furthermore, research is needed so as to understand whether similar 
patterns of reasoning emerge when testing moral development by using dif-
ferent moral transgressions. In prior research, the content of the scenarios 
used and the types of moral transgressions tested by using these scenarios 
have varied greatly. For instance, research has assessed moral transgres-
sions including different moral principles such as others’ welfare (physical 
and psychological harm), unfairness, denial of resources, social exclusion, 
property rights, allocation of resources, and civil rights (Killen & Smetana, 
2014). Often, researchers include only stories testing one or a few of these 
moral principles, yet generalize their findings in terms of moral develop-
ment broadly (Keller, Lourenço, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003; Killen, Mulvey, 
Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011).
However, some prior research has suggested that children provide dif-
ferent patterns of reasoning when different types of stories are assessed. 
Sengsavang et al. (2015), for example, documented differences in reasoning 
in stories about prosocial behavior versus antisocial behavior. In stories about 
engaging in prosocial actions, children referred mostly to other oriented 
reasons, while, in stories about abstaining from antisocial behavior, partici-
pants referenced self-interest, external standards, and rules. Other research 
has found that children’s justifications differ depending on whether they are 
analyzing moral transgressions versus prosocial actions (Nunner-Winkler, 
1999). For instance, Malti, Gasser, et al. (2009) found more moral reasoning 
in stories about stealing than in stories about not sharing. Research to date, 
therefore, demonstrates that different stories can lead to different reasoning 
patterns. Much of this prior research has (a) tested only one or two different 
principles with the same participants, (b) tested only one type of violation 
exemplifying each principle, or (c) contrasted prosocial actions from moral 
transgressions without examining nuances among types of moral transgres-
sions. Thus, additional research is needed to clarify these patterns because 
these initial examinations of variation in reasoning have typically compared 
only reasoning about a limited number of different types of transgressions or 
moral principles. Still needed is research that systematically tests children’s 
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moral judgments across a range of moral transgressions, including different 
moral principles in concert.
Many aspects of morality have been measured in the field (e.g., moral 
identity, moral self, moral emotions, and moral judgments). The focus of 
the current study is on the development of moral judgments, emotion attri-
butions, and moral reasoning. Many researchers studying moral develop-
ment assess children’s judgments by using either a dichotomous evaluation 
or a Likert-type evaluation (Killen & Smetana, 2014). Further, children 
are frequently asked to provide social reasoning to justify their evaluations 
(i.e., they are asked “Why?”) (Killen & Smetana, 2014). However, what fre-
quently varies across studies is the actual measure employed. For instance, 
researchers have asked children to provide a range of types of moral judg-
ments, including act evaluations (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & 
Hitti, 2013), severity ratings (Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996), punishment 
acceptability (Smetana et al., 2012), emotion attributions (Malti & Keller, 
2009), and so on. New research is needed that compares children’s patterns 
of responding across these types of measures in order to clarify children’s 
underlying conceptions when they provide these different evaluations.
The Current Study
The current study focused on two assessments: act evaluation, drawing on 
social domain theory (Smetana, 2006), and emotion attribution, drawing on 
moral motivation theory (Nunner-Winkler, 2007, 2009). These two assess-
ments were chosen because they reflect the core features of social domain 
theory and moral motivation. Participants in the current study ranged 6–8 
years of age because during this developmental period children show an 
awareness of range of moral principles (Smetana, 2006) and because dif-
ferent patterns of moral judgments are, at times, noted during this develop-
mental period. Further, extensive research documents moral judgments in the 
preschool years and adolescence with less concentration on the early school 
years. Yet, children’s emotion attributions during the early school years is of 
particular interest because children frequently make positive emotion attri-
butions when asked how actors who commit moral transgressions will feel 
after the transgression (around 6 years of age), and during this period they 
transition to making negative emotion attributions much more frequently 
(by about 8 years of age) (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). While some 
research has documented age-related differences in this happy victimizer 
effect, other research has found greater continuity across this developmental 
period (Keller et al., 2003). Given the mixed prior findings on developmental 
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differences in judgments and reasoning, it was an open question whether 
there would be age-related differences in terms of reasoning.
Specifically, our goal was to investigate differences in reasoning so 
as to clarify patterns of reasoning displayed by children during this age 
period. For instance, the current study included scenarios that examined 
transgressions including moral principles of others’ welfare, fairness, and 
also includes one mixed story that draws together both—others’ welfare 
and fairness. Moreover, the current study assessed judgments and reason-
ing by using both act evaluation measures and emotion attribution mea-
sures. One aim was to examine differences in reasoning used across these 
types of measures. Prior research demonstrates that act evaluation focuses 
more on the moral principles that reflect why an act is wrong, whereas 
emotion attribution focuses more on the individual motivation behind it 
(Keller, 1996; Malti, Gasser, et al., 2009). Therefore, the current study aims 
to examine whether reasoning demonstrates similar patterns. Furthermore, 
the study was designed to compare children’s moral reasoning across a 
range of different moral transgressions. We aimed to systematically com-
pare children’s moral reasoning elicited by transgressions including differ-
ent moral principles, such as other’s welfare and fairness.
Hypotheses
In terms of reasoning about act evaluation, we expected to find differences 
between transgressions that refer to different moral principles. Specifically, 
we expected transgressions that involve moral principles regarding fairness 
to elicit reasoning related to equality, rights, and fairness (H1) and stories 
that involve principles related to others’ welfare to elicit reasoning related 
to others’ welfare (H2). Additionally, we expected the mixed story would 
elicit reasoning about others’ welfare, as well as about equality, rights, and 
fairness (H3). While this is a straightforward expectation, prior research 
has often not distinguished between different types of moral reasoning 
(instead grouping all types of moral reasoning under the same code) and 
has not compared proportional use of reasoning across stories with trans-
gressions that include different moral principles.
In terms of emotion attribution following moral transgressions, we 
expected that participants who attributed positive emotions would rely on 
self-interest reasoning (H4), whereas those who attributed negative emo-
tions would reference moral reasons (H5). This was based on prior research 
that has demonstrated that some children are happy victimizers and attri-
bute positive emotions and reference individual motives and personal inter-
ests in their reasoning (Nunner-Winkler, 1998, 2007).
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Finally, we expected differences in reasoning for act evaluation  measures 
and emotion attribution measures because these two aspects represent dif-
ferent facets of children’s emerging morality. As moral motivation theory 
(Nunner-Winkler, 2007) demonstrated, knowing moral principles and 
evaluating transgressions based on these principles is rather independent 
from emotion attributions in conjunction with these very same principles. 
Thus, justifications for the validity of moral norms do not necessarily cor-
respond with justifications for attributed emotions following the violation 
of these same norms. Whereas children’s reasoning about their act evalu-
ations represents the moral knowledge they possess (Malti, Gasser, et al., 
2009), the reasoning about their emotion attributions provides additional 
insight into their mental state regarding violations of these moral principles 
(Mulvey, Hitti, & Killen, 2013). Further, neuroscience research has demon-
strated different patterns of emotional responses when moral principles are 
violated (Sommer et al., 2010). Specifically, we expected that self-interest 
reasoning would be used much more frequently for emotion attributions 
(H6) and that moral reasoning would be used much more frequently for 
act evaluations (H7). This is based on prior research that demonstrates that 
children rely on moral reasoning when making act evaluations (Killen & 
Smetana, 2015) and use more personal reasons when making emotion attri-
butions (Arsenio, 2014; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). Given that prior 
research has not documented gender-based differences in reasoning, we 
did not expect any differences based on participant gender.
Method
Participants
Children (N = 130, M = 90.9 months, SD = 7.7, range 71–106 months) from 
elementary schools from small and medium-sized cities in the southwest of 
Germany participated in the study. The sample included more boys (n = 78, 
60%) than girls (n = 52, 40%). The sample was economically diverse and 
approximately one third of the children were from families with migrant 
backgrounds. Teachers and parents were informed by letter about the pro-
cedure and the objectives of the study. Informed parental consent was 
obtained for all participants.
Design and Procedure
A within-subjects design was used. All participants received all tasks in a 
randomized order. After a short warm-up conversation in order to famil-
iarize participants with the interview situation, the interviewer introduced 
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a Likert-type smiley scale and asked a couple of question to familiarize 
participants with the 4-point Likert-type response format (1 = very bad to 
4 = very good). Specifically, children were asked questions like “Which 
smiley would you choose if you felt a little happy”?” and “Which smiley 
shows someone who feels very bad?” until they had used different points 
on the scale. Subsequently, the main interview started. Participants were 
presented five prototypical moral transgression tasks: two fairness stories 
(theft and award without merit), two others’ welfare stories (thirst and teas-
ing), and one mixed story (bullying) that included aspects related to both 
others’ welfare, as well as fairness. Interviews were conducted individu-
ally by trained research assistants in a quiet room either at school or at 
the child’s home. The interviews lasted 15–45 min. Participants were pre-
sented with picture cards illustrating the stories, and interviewers referred 
to the images during the administration of the tasks. The names used in the 
stories matched the gender of the participant.
Tasks and Assessments: Moral Transgressions
All five moral transgression tasks had the same structure, and each 
described a situation in which a protagonist commits a moral transgres-
sion. Participants completed four measures for each story: (a) dichotomous 
act evaluation (“Is what the child did okay or not okay?”; ok/not ok), (b) 
justification for act evaluation (responses to “Why?”), (c) Likert-type emo-
tion attribution to self as victimizer (“What about you? If you had done 
that, how would you feel?” Likert-type: 1 = very bad to 4 = very good), and 
(d) justification for emotion attribution to self as victimizer (responses to 
“Why?”). These four types of measures were used in all stories.
For the emotion attribution analyses, a dichotomous variable was 
created by splitting the Likert-type emotion attribution into positive and 
negative evaluations (Likert-type responses of a and b were recoded as 0, 
and Likert-type responses of c and d were recoded as 1) in order to better 
understand patterns of reasoning for those who attribute positive versus 
negative emotions.
Participants completed two scenarios regarding fairness (theft and 
award without merit) and two scenarios concerning others’ welfare (thirst 
and teasing) and one mixed concerning both—others’ welfare, as well fair-
ness (bullying). The theft story involved one child stealing another child’s 
special candy. The award-without-merit story described two children build-
ing towers, and one of them unjustifiably winning a prize. The thirst story 
was about one child not sharing his drink with a thirsty child. These three 
stories were used in previous research by Nunner-Winkler (1998) and 
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Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988). The teasing story described one child 
being teased in the school yard, and the bullying story involved children 
bullying another child by taking away his shoes and leading him into an 
embarrassing situation. These two stories were previously used by Gasser 
and Keller (2009). These stories were carefully chosen so that they varied 
not only in terms of the moral principle that was tested, but also in terms of 
whether the act was straightforward or prototypic. For instance, the steal-
ing story is a very clear, straightforward moral transgression, whereas the 
award story is more complex but also tests the moral principle of unfair-
ness. Similarly, the teasing story is clearly prototypic, whereas the thirst 
story is more nuanced. Including both stories that were straightforward, as 
well as those that were more complex, enabled us to test with greater cer-
tainty whether differences in reasoning generalize across different types of 
stories testing the same moral principles. See Table 1 for a summary of the 
scenarios and see the appendix for the exact wording of the stories.
Coding and Reliability
Participants’ justifications were coded with coding categories used in the 
previous research (Killen & Stangor, 2001; Smetana et al., 2012), as well 
developed from the interviews themselves resulting in four categories: 
(a) equality, rights, and fairness, (b) others’ welfare, (c) rules and sanc-
tions, and (d) self-interest (see Table 2). The coding system included three 
domains, based on social domain theory (Smetana, 2006): moral, social 
conventional, and psychological.
All justifications were coded by the first author and approximately 
25% of the interviews were coded by a second researcher for inter-rater 
reliability (Cohen’s k = .89). Disagreements were discussed until an agree-
ment was reached. Justifications were coded as 1 = full use of the category; 
Table 1. Summary of the scenarios
Story Moral transgression Moral principle
Teasing Picking on another child Others’ welfare
Thirst Not sharing with a thirsty child Others’ welfare
Award without merit Not sharing an unfairly awarded 
prize with the wronged child
Fairness
Theft Stealing candy from another child Fairness
Bullying Hiding another child’s property 
and thus leading the child into an 
embarrassing situation
Fairness and others’ welfare
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.5 = partial use with one other code; .33 = partial use with two other codes; 
and 0 = no use of the category, and analyses were conducted on propor-
tional use of different types of reasoning.
Results
Data Analyses
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and repeated-measures ANOVAs were 
used to test hypotheses related to differences in children’s reasoning by 
story type and measure. Since preliminary statistical tests did not reveal 
any significant differences based on age or gender, both variables were 
dropped from all analyses.
Act Evaluation
Descriptive statistics. All participants (N = 130) evaluated all stories 
as wrong when completing the dichotomous act evaluation question. 
Therefore, all analyses involving reasoning about act evaluation reference 
reasoning about why the act was wrong.
Act evaluation reasoning. In order to test the hypothesis that partici-
pants will use different reasoning when evaluating the different types of 
stories, a 4 (reasoning: equality/rights/fairness, others’ welfare, rules and 
sanctions, and self-interest) ×5 (story: theft, award without merit, thirst, 
teasing, and bullying) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted.
We expected that, in stories about fairness, participants’ reasoning 
should concern equality, rights, and fairness (H1), whereas, in stories about 
others’ welfare, reasoning should primarily concern others’ welfare (H2). 
In the mixed story, we expected that there would be reasoning from both 
categories (H3). We did not expect reasoning about self-interest or rules 
and sanctions to be used frequently for justifying act evaluations for any 
story. As expected, a main effect of reasoning was found, F(3, 1935) = 
344.74, p <.001, η
p
² = .35, which revealed that participants used more 
Table 2. Coding system
Domain Category Example
Moral Equality/rights/fairness [I]t is not fair to get all the rewards
Others’ welfare [T]hat would hurt him
Social conventional Rules/sanctions [B]ecause it’s a rule at school;because 
you could get in trouble
Psychological Self-interest [B]ecause I love candy
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reasoning about equality, rights, and fairness (M = 0.46, SD = 0.46) than 
others’ welfare (M = 0.39, SD = 0.45) when justifying their act evalua-
tions across all stories. Further, they used self-interest reasoning (M = 0.02, 
SD = 0.14) and reasoning about rules and sanctions infrequently (M = 0.06, 
SD = 0.20). Pairwise comparisons revealed that all groups differed at 
p <.001, except for equality, rights, and fairness versus others’ welfare, 
which differed at p = .027. As expected, there was a significant interaction 
between reasoning and story, F(12, 1935) = 11,574, p <.001, η
p
² = .42. 
Confirming our hypotheses, for all five stories, there were significant dif-
ferences in the use of reasoning (see Table 3).
Fairness stories. As expected, in stories about fairness, children justi-
fied their evaluation primarily with arguments related to equality, rights, and 
fairness. Namely, in the theft story, three quarters of the children (M = 0.76, 
SD = 0.37) referenced equality, rights and fairness. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that participants used more reasoning about equality, rights, and 
fairness than any other code (all ps <.001) and less self-interest reasoning 
than any other code (versus fairness and rules and sanctions, ps <.001; and 
versus welfare, p = .002).
Likewise, in the award without merit story, almost all children (M = 0.96, 
SD = 0.15) referred to equality, rights, and fairness when justifying their 
evaluations. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants used more 
equality, rights, and fairness reasoning than any other code (all ps <.001).
Table 3. Proportional use of reasoning for act evaluation
Story (principle)
Equality/rights/
fairness Others’ welfare
Rules and 
sanctions Self-interest
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Teasing (others’  
 welfare)
0.07 (0.22)o, y, z 0.70 (0.40)o, p, q, ◊, ♯ 0.13 (0.27)p, r 0.04 (0.17)q, r
Thirst (others’  
 welfare)
0.13 (0.30)j, m, x 0.63 (0.46)j, k, l, □, ▼ 0.00 (0.00)k, m, n 0.06 (0.21)l, n
Award without  
 merit (fairness)
0.96 (0.15)g, h, i, z, ☼, ▲ 0.03 (0.12)g, 
□, ▼, ♦
0.00 (0.00)h 0.00 (0.00)i
Theft (fairness) 0.76 (0.37)a, b, c, d, x, y, ▲ 0.12 (0.27)a, f, ◊, ♯ 0.09 (0.25)b, e 0.00 (0.04)c, d, e, f
Bullying (mixed) 0.37 (0.43)u, v 0.47 (0.45)s, t 0.09 (0.27)s, u, w 0.02 (0.15)t, v, w
a, b, c, d, e, g, h, i, j, k, l, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, x, y, z, ↑, □, ▼, ◊, ♯p <.001.
f, wp = .002. 
mp = .001. 
np = .006. 
♦p = .045.
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Others’ welfare stories. Further, as expected, in stories about other’s 
welfare, children justified their evaluation primarily with arguments 
related to other’s welfare. Namely, in the thirst story, participants used 
more reasoning about others’ welfare (M = 0.63, SD = 0.46) than any 
other type of reasoning, all ps <.001. Moreover, participants used less 
reasoning about rules and sanctions than equality, rights, and fairness 
(p = .001) and self-interest (p = .006).
Similarly, for the teasing story, participants used significantly more 
reasoning about other’s welfare (M = 0.70, SD = 0.40) than any other type 
of reasoning (all ps <.001). Moreover, participants used more reasoning 
about rules and sanctions than reasoning about self-interest (p <.001).
Mixed story. As expected in the mixed story (bullying), participants 
used more reasoning about others’ welfare (M = 0.47, SD = 0.45) and 
equality, rights, and fairness (M = 0.37, SD = 0.43) than either of the other 
types of reasoning (all ps <.001). Moreover, participants used more reason-
ing about rules and sanctions than about self-interest (p = .002).
Reasoning across stories. Furthermore, as expected, equality, rights, 
and fairness reasoning was more used in stories referring to fairness (H1), 
and others’ welfare reasoning was used more often in stories referring to 
others’ welfare (H2). For both types of reasoning, there were significant 
differences in the use across stories. As expected, in the two stories refer-
ring to fairness (theft and award without merit), participants used more rea-
soning about equality, rights, and fairness than in stories related to others’ 
welfare (teasing and thirst) (all ps <.001). Additionally, more reasoning 
about equality, rights, and fairness was used in the award-without-merit 
story than in the theft story (p <.001). Further, in the two stories refer-
ring to others’ welfare (thirst and teasing), participants used significantly 
more others’ welfare reasoning than in the stories referring to fairness (all 
ps <.001). Additionally, participants used more reasoning about others’ 
welfare in the theft story than in the award-without-merit story (p = .045). 
All proportions of use of reasoning for act evaluation and the respective 
pairwise comparisons can be found in Table 3.
Emotion Attribution
Descriptive statistics. For each story, a proportion of the participants 
asserted that if they had committed the act that they would feel positive 
emotions (happy victimizers) (see Table 4).
Emotion attribution reasoning. In order to test our hypotheses that 
participants who expected that they would feel positive emotions if they 
committed the act would use self-interest reasons to justify their positive 
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emotions (H4), while those who attributed negative emotions would refer-
ence moral reasons (H5), a 2 (emotion attribution: positive and negative) 
×4 (reasoning: equality/rights/fairness, others’ welfare, rules/sanctions, 
and self-interest) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was 
conducted for each story.
Others’ welfare stories. For the teasing story, there was a main effect 
for reasoning, F(3, 384) = 21.21, p <.001, η
p
² = .14. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that participants used more reasoning about others’ welfare than 
about equality, rights, and fairness (p = .001) and more reasoning about 
other’s welfare than about self-interest (p <.001) (see Table 5). Moreover, 
they used more reasoning about self-interest than about rules and sanctions 
(p <.001). Additionally, there was an interaction between emotion attribu-
tion and reasoning: F(3, 384) = 33.88, p <.001, η
p
² = .21. As expected, 
participants who thought that they would feel positive emotions referenced 
primarily self-interest and thereby used more self-interest reasoning than 
did those who attributed negative emotions (p <.001). In contrast, those 
who thought that they would feel negative emotions were more likely to 
reference others’ welfare (p <.001) and rules and sanctions (p = .032) than 
did those who thought that they would feel positive emotions.
For the thirst story, there was also main effect for reasoning: F(3, 375) = 
32.91, p <.001, η
p
² = .21. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants 
used more reasoning about others’ welfare and self-interest than about 
either equality, rights, and fairness or about rules and sanctions (p = .020 
for others’ welfare versus equality, rights, and fairness; p = .022 for others’ 
welfare versus rules and sanctions; and p <.001 for comparisons includ-
ing self-interest). There was also an interaction between emotion attribu-
tion and reasoning: F(3, 375) = 41.86, p <.001, η
p
² = .25. This interaction 
revealed that participants who thought they would feel positive emotions 
cited self-interests more than did those who thought that they would feel 
negative emotions (p <.001). However, those who thought they would feel 
Table 4. Number and percentage of happy victimizers per story
Story (principle) Number of happy 
victimizers
Percentage of happy 
victimizers
Teasing (others’ welfare) 26 20.0
Thirst (others’ welfare) 23 17.7
Award without merit (fairness) 76 58.5
Theft (fairness) 17 13.1
Bullying (mixed) 34 26.2
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negative emotions relied more on reasoning about others’ welfare than did 
those who thought they would feel positive emotions (p <.001).
Fairness stories. For the award-without-merit story, there was a main 
effect for reasoning: F(3, 351) = 140.59, p <.001, η
p
² = .55. Pairwise com-
parisons revealed that participants used more reasoning related to equality, 
rights, and fairness than any other form of reasoning (all ps <.001, except 
for self-interest, which differed at p = .045). They also used more self-
interest reasoning than reasoning about either other’s welfare and rules and 
sanctions (ps <.001). As with the other stories, there was also an interaction 
between reasoning and emotion attribution: F(3, 351) = 231.27, p <.001, 
η
p
² = .66. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants used more rea-
soning about equality, rights, and fairness if they thought they would have 
negative feelings (p <.001) and more reasoning about self-interest if they 
thought they would have positive feelings (p <.001).
For the theft story, there was a main effect for reasoning: 
F(3, 384) = 6.16, p = .001, η
p
² = .05. This revealed that participants used 
more reasoning about self-interest than about any other code. Further, 
there was an interaction between emotion attribution and reasoning: 
F(3, 384) = 25.67, p <.001, η
p
² = .17. This revealed that participants used 
more reasoning about others’ welfare (p <.001) and equality, rights, and 
fairness if they thought that they would feel negative emotions (p = .004) 
and more reasoning about self-interest if they thought that they would feel 
positive emotions (p <.001).
Mixed. For the mixed story (bullying), there was main effect for 
reasoning: F(3, 381) = 13.95, p <.001, η
p
² = .10. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that participants used more reasoning about self-interest than any 
other type of reasoning (ps <.001). Additionally, there was an interaction 
between reasoning and emotion attribution: F(3, 381) = 42.57, p <.001, 
η
p
² = .25. This interaction demonstrated that participants who thought 
they would feel negative emotions referenced others’ welfare (p = .001) 
and equality, rights, and fairness (p <.001) more than did participants 
who thought they would feel positive emotions. Furthermore, those who 
thought that participants would feel positive emotions were much more 
likely to reference self-interest than were those who thought they would 
feel negative emotions (p <.001).
Reasoning Across Measures
The next analysis examined differences in types of reasoning across mea-
sures (act evaluation and emotion attribution). Therefore, a summary score 
was created for moral reasoning by summing the coding categories equality, 
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rights, and fairness and others’ welfare. We included self-interest reason-
ing and moral reasoning in the analyses, but omitted rules and sanctions 
because of the low frequency with which this type of reasoning was used 
across both measures. In order to test our hypotheses that there would be 
differences in the use of self-interest reasoning (H6) and in the use of moral 
reasoning (H7) between act evaluation and emotion attribution a 4 (rea-
soning: moral reasoning about act evaluation, self-interest reasoning about 
act evaluation, moral reasoning about emotion attribution, and self-interest 
reasoning about emotion attribution) ×5 (story: theft award without merit, 
thirst, teasing, and bullying) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted.
There was an overall effect for reasoning: F(3, 1893) = 521.07, 
p <.001, η
p
² = .45. Pairwise comparisons revealed that all groups dif-
fered at p <.001. Of particular interest, this revealed that participants 
used more moral reasoning for the act evaluation justifications (M = 0.84, 
SD = 0.33) than for the emotion attribution justifications (M = 0.50, SD = 0.47) 
(p <.001). Further, they used more self-interest reasoning for the emotion 
attribution justifications (M = 0.28, SD = 0.42) than for the act evaluation 
justifications (M = 0.025, SD = 0.14) (p <.001).
As expected, there was also a significant interaction between reasoning 
and measure: F(12, 1893) = 9.08, p <.001, η
p
² = .05. This revealed signifi-
cant differences in the use of self-interest reasoning as well as in the use 
Table 6. Proportional use of self-interest and moral reasoning in act evaluation 
vs. emotion attribution
Act evaluation
M (SD)
Emotion attribution
M (SD)
Self-interest reasoning
 Teasing (others’ welfare) 0.04 (0.17)a 0.26 (0.42)a
 Thirst (others’ welfare) 0.06 (0.22)b 0.25 (0.41)b
 Award without merit (fairness) 0.00 (0.00)c 0.51 (0.46)c
 Theft (fairness) 0.00 (0.04)d 0.14 (0.32)d
 Bullying (mixed) 0.02 (0.15)e 0.26 (0.43)e
Moral reasoning
 Teasing (others’ welfare) 0.77 (0.37)f 0.39 (0.47)f
 Thirst (others’ welfare) 0.75 (0.42)g 0.52 (0.47)g
 Award without merit (fairness) 0.99 (0.09)h 0.44 (0.46)h
 Theft (fairness) 0.88 (0.29)i 0.68 (0.44)i
 Bullying (mixed) 0.84 (0.35)j 0.48 (0.49)j
a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, jp <.001.
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of moral reasoning between the two types of measures. Namely, in all five 
stories, we found significantly more references to self-interest in the rea-
soning about emotion attribution than in the reasoning about act evaluation 
and significantly more moral reasons in the reasoning about act evaluation 
than in the reasoning about emotion attribution (all ps <.001) (see Table 6).
Discussion
Our novel results indicate very different patterns of reasoning for each 
measure and for transgressions including different moral principles provid-
ing a robust pattern of results for moral cognition in the early elementary-
school years. Specifically, participants overwhelmingly referenced moral 
reasons when justifying act evaluations. Further, moral reasons were used 
much less frequently for emotion attributions. Interestingly, for emotion 
attributions, self-interest reasoning was much more common than for act 
evaluations. However, as revealed by the analyses that compare reasoning 
about emotion attribution for those participants who attribute positive emo-
tions and those who attribute negative emotions, self-interest reasoning was 
driven by those participants who make positive attributions. Therefore, the 
current study revealed that children weigh different concerns when mak-
ing different types of moral judgments. This suggests that future research 
should use multiple types of measures to ensure that a complete picture 
of children’s moral reasoning is obtained and suggests the importance of 
looking both to how participants differentiate their judgments by domain, 
drawing on social domain theory (Smetana, 2006), and to variation in their 
moral motivations (Nunner-Winkler, 2007, 2009). The current findings 
advance our understanding of moral reasoning by demonstrating that chil-
dren differentiate between different types of moral violations and that they 
distinguish between their understanding of their emotional response to a 
transgression and their evaluation of the acceptability of the moral viola-
tion that has occurred.
Thus, the findings demonstrate sophistication in children’s reason-
ing. Participants recognized all of the acts as wrong and used moral rea-
sons when justifying this. Further, although the majority also expected 
they would feel bad if they committed these violations (and justified this 
emotion by using moral reasons), some children expected they would feel 
positive emotions. These findings align with prior research on happy vic-
timizers (Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Keller et al., 2003; Krettenauer, Malti, 
& Sokol, 2008; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013) and reinforce the idea that this 
pattern of feeling positive emotions when you commit a transgression is 
not based on a lack of understanding that the act was wrong, but rather 
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is driven by personal motives (Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Krettenauer et al., 
2008). Interestingly, while prior research has demonstrated age-related dif-
ferences in the happy-victimizer phenomenon (Krettenauer et al., 2008), 
we documented no differences in reasoning by age group. What our find-
ings suggest is that at 6–8 years of age, children are keenly aware of a range 
of different moral principles and are demonstrating complex forms of 
social cognition and differentiating their responses, even though some chil-
dren during this developmental period still expect they would feel positive 
emotions following these transgressions. Further, our focus in the current 
study was on reasoning in particular. In line with prior research that has 
not identified age-related differences in reasoning (Malti & Keller, 2009; 
Nunner-Winkler, 1998), our results also demonstrate consistency across 
the ages of 6–8 years in reasoning patterns. Since this is a fairly narrow age 
range, future research should aim to replicate the current study with older 
and younger participants in order to test for age differences among children 
with a larger age range.
As predicted, the findings documented different patterns of reasoning 
for different types of moral violations. The stories centered on others’ wel-
fare elicited reasoning related to others’ welfare; the stories centered on fair-
ness elicited reasoning related to equality, rights, and fairness; and the mixed 
story elicited both types of moral reasoning. This demonstrates that research-
ers should test multiple types of moral transgressions when assessing moral 
development because they do not all function in the same manner. Further, 
it confirms predictions based on social domain theory that suggest that com-
plex stories that draw on multiple moral principles will elicit multiple forms 
of reasoning or reasoning from more than one domain (Richardson, Mulvey, 
& Killen, 2012). What the current findings document is that mixed stories 
can also elicit more than one type of reasoning from within the same domain. 
In this instance, although participants still used primarily moral reasoning, 
they employed both moral reasoning related to others’ welfare, as well as 
moral reasoning related to equality, rights, and fairness.
The current study is the one of the first to draw together distinct 
research trajectories in moral development. This is important because 
there has been recent debate among researchers on the role of emotions 
in moral judgments (Arsenio et al., 2006; Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 
2012; Turiel, 2006). What our findings demonstrate is that evaluations of 
act acceptability are justified in different ways than are emotional reactions 
to hypothetical moral violations. Also, although children do use more self-
interest reasoning when making emotion attributions than when evaluating 
act acceptability, children are consistent in recognizing a key role for moral 
reasons across these types of judgments.
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Further, the findings are novel in demonstrating the importance of dis-
tinguishing different types of moral reasoning and testing multiple moral 
principles within the same study. However, still more work needs to be done 
in this area. Specifically, our focus was on moral transgressions, but future 
research should continue to examine different patterns of reasoning for 
distinct prosocial actions, as well (Sengsavang et al., 2015). Additionally, 
future research should attend to whether reasoning patterns differ depend-
ing on the group membership of the actors involved in the violations. For 
instance, prior research demonstrates that intergroup moral judgments may 
be more challenging for children to make than are moral judgments involv-
ing peers with whom one shares group membership (Killen & Smetana, 
2015; Mulvey, 2016; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013). Finally, future research 
should extend this research approach to a wider developmental period, 
especially given that some research indicates that moral development may 
resemble a U-shaped curve (Nucci & Turiel, 2009).
Despite these limitations, the current findings suggest that children 
do show sophisticated and logical patterns of reasoning in relation to both 
act evaluation and emotion attribution, but that these different measures 
touch different aspects of moral development. Therefore, future research 
should include multiple types of measures in concert when examining 
moral judgments. Additionally, as parents and educators foster children’s 
moral development, they should consider talking with children both about 
acceptability of acts and about the emotions the children might feel dur-
ing moral violations in order to aid children in thinking through differ-
ent dimensions of moral evaluations. Further, and importantly, the current 
findings reflect the importance of talking with children about the reasons 
why they might think an act is okay or not okay or might feel a particular 
way after committing a violation. Finally, these findings reveal that not all 
moral transgressions are treated in the same way—rather, different pat-
terns of reasoning are associated with different types of transgressions. 
Therefore, parents and educators should ensure that their conversations 
about moral transgressions are context specific and that they attend to the 
nuances of the situation. For instance, they might reference the precise 
type of harm inflicted or rights infringed upon when discussing transgres-
sions. Further, parents and educators can use moral violations as a learn-
ing opportunity to discuss similarities and differences between different 
types of social transgressions.
In summary, the present findings reveal differential use of reasoning 
depending both on (a) the type of measure employed and (b) the moral 
nature of the violation that occurs. Further, the findings bridge social 
domain theory (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) and moral motivation theory 
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(Nunner-Winkler, 2007; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988), revealing that 
the theories are not in conflict, but rather complement each other as they 
each center on different aspects of children’s moral development, support-
ing research by Arsenio (2014). Thus, the findings demonstrate the com-
plexity of moral development in childhood and highlight the important 
ways in which reasoning differs across measures and situations.
Appendix
Teasing (Others’ Welfare)
This is Nina/Dario. During recess, he is being teased by Anna/Max and her/
his friend. Nina/Dario cannot defend herself/himself and does a hard job 
not to cry.
Is what Max/Anna did okay or not okay? Why?
Anna/Max also knows that it is not okay to tease other children, but 
she/he does so, though.
What about you? If you had done that, how would you feel? Why?
Thirst (Others’ Welfare)
Andrea/David is on a field trip in the zoo. It is very hot. When they are 
having a break, she/he takes out her/his bottle and drinks. There comes 
Melanie/Tim and asks, “Andrea/David, I am so thirsty, can I have some of 
your drink?” Andrea/David denies the request and finishes her/his drink 
herself/himself.
Is what Andrea/David did okay or not okay? Why?
Andrea/David also knows that it was not okay to do so, but she/he has 
done so, though.
What about you? If you had done that, how would you feel? Why?
Award Without Merit (Fairness)
These are Kathrin/Klaus and Eva/Eric: They are playing who can build the 
highest tower. This is Marion/Martin: She/he is the referee. Do you know 
what a referee is? (Let the child explain. If she/he doesn’t know, explain.)
Now both towers are very high. Can you count the blocks for me? They 
are exactly the same height. But Marion/Martin, the referee says, “Eva/Eric, 
your tower is higher. You get the award!” and she/he gives Eva/Eric a little bag 
with marbles. Kathrin/Klaus says, “Hey, my tower is as high as your tower!” 
But Eva/Eric declares, “I got the prize. I’ll keep all of the marbles for myself!”
Is what Eva/Eric did okay or not okay? Why?
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Eva/Eric also knows that it was not okay to take the marbles and keep 
them all for herself/himself.
What about you? If you had done that, how would you feel? Why?
Theft (Fairness)
These are Friederike/Florian and Tanja/Thomas. They are in the cloak-
room of their school, hanging up their coats. Tanja/Thomas takes out a 
small bag with candy and says, “Look, what I got from my aunt yester-
day.” Friederike/Florian really likes this kind of candy, too. Later this 
morning, Friederike/Florian is going to the restrooms alone. He spots 
Tanja’s/Thomas’ coat where she/he left the candy. Friederike/Florian 
approaches the coat, takes the candy out, and puts it into his own pocket. 
Nobody was around who could have seen her/him. Later, when the chil-
dren go out to play Tanja/Thomas notices that his candy is gone. Now he 
is sad.
Is what Friederike/Florian did okay or not okay? Why?
Friederike/Florian also knows that it was not okay to take the candy, 
but she/he took it, though.
What about you? If you had taken the candy, how would you feel? 
Why?
Bullying (Mixed)
The children are in the locker room changing for gym class. This is Lara/
Michael: She/he is just putting on her/his gym shoes. These are Jasmin/
Fabio and her/his friend. They do not like Lara/Michael and are talking 
about how they could tease her/him best. When Lara/Michael has left 
for the gym, they hide her/his outdoor shoes on a high shelf so that Lara/
Michael cannot reach them.
Is what Jasmin/Fabio and her/his friend did okay or not 
okay? Why?
They also know that it was not okay, but they did so, though.
After gym class, when everybody has changed Lara/Michael is still 
looking for his shoes. After a long search she/he spots them on the shelf 
but cannot get them down. So, she/he gives in and returns to class in her 
gym shoes. The teacher is yelling at him because he is late and still wear-
ing his gym shoes. Lara/Michael is so hysterical that she/he cannot explain 
herself/himself.
What about you? If it would have been you hid the shoes, how would 
you feel? Why?
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